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Calling law a "profession" means it is more than just selling a service for money1. Lawyers have special training and are regulated by law societies2, and they owe duties beyond making a profit3. The idea of a profession is that lawyers have responsibilities to their clients and to society, not just to themselves4. The public interest adds the idea5 that lawyers serve society as a whole, not just paying clients6. Lawyers are officers of the court and have to uphold the administration of justice.7 So the commentator is wrong to say law is just a business8, because lawyers have professional duties that ordinary businesses do not have9.

The statement overstates the case.1 The duty to negotiate is not an amendment of the Constitution but a principled elaboration of the four foundational principles the Court itself identified in the Secession Reference2 — federalism, democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, and respect for minorities3. The Court held that a clear majority on a clear question would give rise to a reciprocal duty on all parties to negotiate4, while making clear these principles could not override the text of Part V5. The duty is political in its enforcement — the Court expressly said the content of the obligations was not justiciable and would be policed by the political actors6 and ultimately the electorate, not the courts. Part V sets out the amending procedures7 — the general 7/50 formula in s. 38, unanimity in s. 41 for certain matters8, and the bilateral and unilateral procedures. The Reference did not add a new procedure to these9; secession would still require a constitutional amendment under Part V. What the Court did was hold that the underlying principles inform how those procedures are approached — a province cannot unilaterally secede, but equally the rest of Canada could not simply ignore a clear democratic expression10. The critique that this was "amendment by the judiciary" assumes that anything not written in Part V is illegitimate when recognised by the Court11. But the unwritten principles have long been part of Canadian constitutional law, from the Patriation Reference onward12, and the Court rooted the duty in them rather than in its own preference13. The better view is that the Court filled a gap the text left open14 — the text says how to amend but nothing about the prior political obligations a clear referendum result would create15 — without displacing the text. The duty to negotiate is best understood as a constitutional convention given voice, not a new legal amending rule.16

Actus reus. Sexual assault under s. 271 requires touching of a sexual nature1 without the complainant's consent. Consent under s. 273.1 is the voluntary agreement of the complainant3 to engage in the sexual activity in question, assessed subjectively from the complainant's own state of mind at the time of the touching4 (Ewanchuk). The trial judge accepts Mara's evidence that she did not consent to any activity beyond the kissing, that she "went somewhere else", turned to the wall and stopped responding6. On that finding the actus reus is made out7: there is no consent in fact to the intercourse. Silence, passivity or a lack of resistance is not consent8 (Ewanchuk); nor does her prior consensual history or her coming to his apartment supply consent to this activity9, because consent must be to the specific activity in question and cannot be given in advance. Mens rea and honest but mistaken belief.10 The mens rea is the intention to touch while knowing of, or being reckless or wilfully blind to, the absence of consent11. Evan may raise honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent12. But the belief must be in communicated consent13 — the complainant must have said or done something to communicate agreement (Ewanchuk). Evan points to her coming over14, her "maybe", and that "she never said no." None of these communicates agreement to the intercourse15; a belief grounded in silence, passivity or the absence of a16 "no" is not a belief in communicated consent and cannot ground the defence17. Section 273.2 places further limits18: the defence is not available where the belief arose from the accused19's self-induced intoxication, or from recklessness or wilful blindness, or where the accused did not take reasonable steps to ascertain consent20 in the circumstances known to him21. Evan had "a lot to drink" and took no steps at all22 — he said nothing and asked nothing. On this record there is no air of reality to the defence, so it should not be left to the trier of fact23. Burden of proof. The Crown must prove every element, including absence of consent and the fault element24, beyond a reasonable doubt; the accused bears no burden to prove his belief, only to point to an air of reality25. Here the elements are proven and the defence has no air of reality26. Evan should be convicted.

RE: Marcus Deane — standards of review (a) The Board's discretionary decision insofar as it limits s. 2(b). Where an administrative decision engages a Charter right1, the framework is Doré/Loyola2, applied within the Vavilov reasonableness standard3. The decision is reviewed for reasonableness4, but reasonableness here asks5 whether the decision-maker proportionately balanced the Charter protection with the statutory objective6 — whether the limit on Deane's expression was proportionate to the goal of maintaining public confidence in the profession7. Because the panel's reasons do not mention freedom of expression at all and simply assert that public confidence "must come first", there is a strong argument the decision is unreasonable for failing to engage in the required Doré balancing8. But the standard is reasonableness, not correctness.9 (b) The argument that punishing pure political speech falls outside the s. 2 power / is a constitutional question. Vavilov preserves correctness for constitutional questions.10 The key is characterisation11: Doré distinguishes the constitutionality of a law (correctness) from the Charter-compliant exercise of a statutory discretion12 (reasonableness). If Deane challenges the constitutional validity of ss. 2 and 20 themselves13 — that the Act cannot validly reach pure political expression — that is a constitutional question reviewed on correctness14. If he challenges how the discretion was exercised against him on these facts, that is Doré reasonableness. (c) The question of law on the s. 31(1) appeal. Where the legislature provides a statutory right of appeal15, Vavilov holds that appellate standards apply16: questions of law are reviewed on correctness17, and questions of fact or mixed fact and law on palpable and overriding error18. Because s. 31(1) confines the appeal to19 "a question of law only20", any question properly taken up on that appeal is reviewed on correctness21. The s. 31(4) finality clause does not displace the appeal right the statute expressly grants22, nor does it oust review of the constitutional questions.